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‘‘That which Marreth All’’: Constancy and
Gender in The Virtuous Octavia
Yvonne Bruce

I

N his study of the influence of French Senecanism on the drama of the Pembroke circle, A. M. Witherspoon effectively dismisses Samuel Brandon’s
1598 closet drama, The Virtuous Octavia. Calling it ‘‘a servile imitation of
[Samuel Daniel’s] Cleopatra’’1 Witherspoon suggests that Brandon chose to
dramatize the plight of Octavia because all the good dramatic subjects—
namely Antony and Cleopatra—had already been taken by other playwrights.
There are compelling reasons for Brandon’s choice of Octavia, however—as
well as for Daniel’s own choice of her as a character in his ‘‘Letter from
Octavia to Marcus Antonius’’ and for Fulke Greville’s choice of her as a
character in ‘‘Letter to an Honourable Lady.’’ The Octavia figure, in classical
sources as well as in Renaissance representations, epitomizes the long-suffering and long-virtuous wife of a philandering husband, an epitome of direct
consequence for the dedicatees of Brandon’s, Daniel’s, and Greville’s works.
But Octavia, chosen ostensibly by these poets to exemplify a feminine ideal
of Christian Stoic resolve, serves as more than a classical model for a few
literary patrons; she is also used to explore the inadequacies Christian Stoicism’s hybrid morality presented to women, as this hybrid was popularly
understood to exist in late Elizabethan England.
The treatment of Stoicism in this group of writings centers on ‘‘the heroics
of constancy,’’ to use Mary Ellen Lamb’s expression.2 ‘‘Constancy’’ itself is
a vexed term, not only because it resists stable definition, as any abstraction
does, but also because its meaning is fluid in both the classical and early
modern understanding of Stoicism. For example, Guillaume Du Vair, in La
Philosophie Morale des Stoı̈ques, translated into English as The Moral Philosophy of the Stoicks in 1598, the same year Brandon’s drama was registered
by the Stationers’ Company, follows Seneca in expressing the belief that ‘‘the
good & happines of man consisteth in the right use of reason, and what is
that but vertue, which is nothing els but a constant disposition of will.’’3 Seneca describes this ‘‘constant disposition’’ variously, however, as ratio immutabilis, moderatus, firmitas, and constare, and he distinguishes his Stoicism
from ‘‘Certain of our school [who] think that, of all such qualities, a stout

endurance is not desirable.’’4 Joseph Hall, the ‘‘English Seneca,’’ writing
shortly after the turn of the seventeenth century, identifies ‘‘tranquillity’’ as
one of Stoicism’s chief virtues, but in his lengthy Christian interpretation of
it, he calls it variously ‘‘constancy,’’ ‘‘controlement,’’ and ‘‘composedness of
mind.’’5 Montaigne, who takes issue with Stoic precepts throughout his essays, defines constancy in ‘‘Of Repenting’’ as a ‘‘languishing and wavering
dance’’ and questions the supremacy of reason itself in ‘‘Of Constancy.’’6
Cicero’s De Officiis, the least purely Stoic of his philosophical works but the
most popular in the sixteenth century, appearing in nearly twenty translated
editions or reprints, is, like Du Vair’s work, an amalgam of ethical instruction
that promulgates the cardinal virtues, glossed in translation as wisdom, justice, fortitude, and temperance, but variously defined and described by Cicero. ‘‘Constancy’’ may correspond either to fortitude or to temperance, but
both qualities are interpreted similarly, as states of a soul that holds external
things in contempt [quarum una in rerum externarum despicientia ponitur]
and controls all its own perturbations [omnisque sedatio perturbationum
animi].7
The greatest advocate of Stoic constancy and the greatest popularizer of
Stoic thought in the 1590s—in England and on the Continent—was the Dutch
scholar Justus Lipsius. In his De Constantia, available in England in 1594 in
John Stradling’s translation, Two Bookes of Constancie, Lipsius attempts to
make Stoic constancy an active Christian quality. Two Bookes is cast as a
dialogue between the student Lipsius and the constant and virtuous teacher
Langius. Lipsius meets Langius as Lipsius is on his way to Vienna, fleeing
the civil wars in his ‘‘unfortunate and unhappie Belgica.’’8 This provokes, in
book 1 of the work, a long lecture from Langius on the fruitlessness of flight,
for the civil war that Lipsius seeks to flee is in his mind. Languis advises
Lipsius to ‘‘seek remedie from Wisdome and Constancie,’’ and he continues
to discuss at length those external things that cannot be controlled and therefore should have no power over the mind, including the ‘‘publicke evils’’ of
civil war. Departing sharply from the Stoic advice given in Cicero’s De Officiis, Langius exposes the foolishness of patriotic feeling, which is merely the
result of popular opinion and custom, and advises Lipsius to submit to divine
reason, which alone can distinguish virtue. ‘‘The smoake of OPINIONS,’’
claims Langius, ‘‘striveth . . . for the body,’’ while ‘‘Reason striveth for the
soul.’’ Reason, which leads to constancy, springs from the ‘‘the mind of the
soule,’’ for ‘‘albeit the soul be infected and a little corrupted with the filth of
the bodie and contagion of the senses: yet it . . . is not without certaine cleare
sparks of the pure fiery nature from whence it proceeded.’’9 Guillaume Du
Vair too warns against the ‘‘false opinions’’ of the affections, which can be
banished only by ‘‘Wisdome . . . the beginning and end of all vertues.’’ The
soul has many ‘‘contrarie’’ parts within it, and those passions ‘‘which do

waxe most mutinous and troublesome . . . doe first arise in the appetible or
concupiscible parte.10
The Christian Stoicism of Lipsius and Du Vair clearly debases the soul
with the body, which makes apprehending reason (and thus achieving a ‘‘constant disposition’’) through the corrupted channels of sense an oppressive
task. This Christian Stoic position is one also taken by the Academic Skeptics
and, among the Pembroke dramatists, pursued by Greville in his late verse
and by Thomas Kyd in The Spanish Tragedy (although the idea is too common to Protestant thinking for a shared belief in it to have special significance, it is worth noting that Philip Sidney expresses the same idea in his
Defence of Poesy). In Two Bookes of Constancie, the wise man is advised, in
accordance with classical Stoicism, to strive for a kind of Platonic union with
universal nature, but the obstacles to this union are well known: not only
the inability of the senses to objectively perceive external reality but also the
difficulty or even impossibility of the wise man to achieve a state of being
that would make him, according to Seneca, different from the gods only in
his mortality.11 Du Vair’s Christian conclusion to The Moral Philosophie advocates prayer ‘‘in invocation of [God’s] divine favour,’’ because ‘‘our naturall forces can never bee sufficient of themselves to keep us in . . .
perfection.’’12 In his introduction to Heaven Upon Earth, Joseph Hall envies
the heathen Stoics their wisdom in treading the path to tranquillity without
the benefit of God’s guidance, yet he pities them their ‘‘Mistris Nature,’’ who
has ‘‘never performed without much imperfection.’’13 It is Christianity’s
unique (but Skeptical) contribution to Stoicism to insist upon this distinction
between nature and God and upon the corruption of the soul in its physical
prison so that God’s grace and man’s free will in choosing faith might be
emphasized.
Another difficulty with defining (and thus achieving) Stoic constancy is
that ‘‘constancy’’ is frequently glossed as ‘‘patient suffering,’’ but this is a
wholly Christian construction of the word (both Tudor writers and contemporary scholars are guilty of this Christianization). Classical Stoic constancy is
not a Job-like passivity but an active—and largely impossible—achievement
of the will, one that comes from the sapiens’ recognition of the unity of nature, God, and reason. Each is a different name for the same transcendent
virtue it is the wise man’s duty to obey and manifest. Thus Epictetus notes
of one who is ‘‘making progress’’ toward wisdom that ‘‘he has got rid of the
will to get, and his will to avoid is directed no longer to what is beyond our
power but only to what is in our power and contrary to nature.’’14 In Cicero’s
words, ‘‘No one who is totally self-reliant, and contains within himself all
that he owns, can fail to be completely happy.’’15 Seneca advises that, to live
the good life, the mind must achieve ‘‘a uniform energy . . . and there will
thus be born that unerring reason . . . which, when it has regulated itself and
has . . . harmonized all its parts, has attained the highest good . . . The highest

good is the harmony of the soul; for the virtues will be bound to exist where
there is agreement and unity.’’ 16 Justus Lipsius, however, doubts that true
constancy can be achieved by the Christian and advocates moderation of the
passions rather than the Stoic elimination of them. ‘‘[T]he true mother of
Constancie is PATIENCE, and lowlinesse of mind, which is A voluntarie sufferance without grudging of all things whatsoeuer can happen to, or in a
man.’’17 Lipsian constancy seems to spring from Christian humility, which
resembles classical forbearance more closely than it resembles Stoic apatheia. Unfortunately, Lipsius’s attempt to redefine constancy and to link Stoic
paradox to the mysteries of faith had a negative impact on, among others,
James I, who derided Lipsian constancy as that ‘‘Stoick insensible stupiditie’’18 which could very well lead, via a deadening of the emotional and moral
sense, to indolence and inconstancy. Neither was insensibility confined to the
Stoics, as Gilles Montsarrat points out: ‘‘Sometimes Christian patience even
comes perilously close to the oft-denounced ‘senselessness’ of the Stoics’’;
Montsarrat cites Gabriel Powell’s condemnation of Job, who ‘‘seemed as it
were, to take pleasure in his afflictions.’’19 Powell’s skepticism toward the
exemplar of Christian patience recalls Montaigne’s toward the exemplar of
Stoic constancy, Cato the Younger. Ruminating on Cato’s suicide, Montaigne
‘‘cannot believe that [Cato] merely maintained himself in the attitude that the
rules of the Stoic sect ordained for him . . . I believe that he felt pleasure and
bliss in so noble an action, and that he enjoyed himself more in it than in any
other action of this life.’’20 Joseph Hall does not see suffering as salutary either. To achieve ‘‘tranquillity,’’ which is a ‘‘steadinesse of the mind,’’ one
needs resolution, and ‘‘how can that vessel which is beaten upon, by contrary
waves and winds (and tottereth to either part) be said to keep a steady
course?’’21 Hall’s use of this image is in contrast to it in Lipsius’s Two
Bookes: ‘‘let showres, thunders, lighteninges, and tempestes fall round about
thee, thou shalt crie boldlie with a loude voyce, I lie at rest amid the
waves.’’22
As the descriptions by Montaigne, Powell, James, and others make vividly
clear, ‘‘constancy’’ is subject to a variety of often incompatible interpretations, including, as we have seen, inconstancy. The pose of Stoic indifference
had a vogue in Renaissance Europe, for example, particularly on the Continent, much like the vogue for melancholy. The ease with which inconstancy,
or at least the indolence and amorality feared by James, could be taken for
its opposite led Stoic writers themselves to link Stoic behavior with acting—
with all acting’s debauched connotations—and gave the Tudor stage material
for its caricatured figure of the Stoic in the stocks. This ambivalence toward
Stoic constancy was exacerbated if the constant figure in question was a
woman. While Stoicism has conventionally been considered a doctrine of the
disenfranchised, like early Christianity—one may have power over one’s reason or faith even if one has no power over anything else—the reputed indif-

ference of the Stoic is a function of his self-sovereignty, hardly a desirable
trait in a sixteenth-century woman. Although the writings of the Roman Stoics tend simply to discount women,23 the social role and behavior of women
were of concern to Tudor Christians writing in a time of religious crisis in
France and the Netherlands and, of course, under the reign of Elizabeth.
In instructional texts written and translated throughout the sixteenth century, Christian humanists and Protestant reformers shared some goals in their
plans to educate women: while the former emphasized facility with languages
and the study of classical texts and the latter emphasized biblical exegesis,
both kinds of educators saw this study as a means to a pious end. Women’s
piety, however, especially for the Protestant reformers, was dependent on its
adherence to standards of conduct laid out by men.24 Female constancy as
the primary observable element of faithfulness or obedience toward God was
measured by faithfulness or obedience toward men—usually their husbands.
Because women’s constancy was judged first by men and only second by
God, judgment was plagued by the same weaknesses associated with constancy: first, the appearance of constancy might not convey true constancy,
thus women—being naturally duplicitous—were under greater pressure than
men to conform to conventional standards of Christian Stoic behavior (modesty, silence, equanimity), or to both ‘‘be and seem,’’ as Elizabeth Cary’s
motto had it. Second, judgment depended upon the ability of men to apprehend the difference between true and feigned constancy. These weaknesses
led to the paradoxical expectations for women’s constancy explored in the
Octavia characters created by Daniel, Greville, and Brandon.
Of these writers, Samuel Daniel advocates the most classically Stoic constancy, in his epistle ‘‘To the Lady Margaret, Countesse of Cumberland.’’
Daniel knew the countess at first hand, tutoring her daughter the Lady Anne
Clifford and dedicating an epistle to her; the countess herself, wife of George
Clifford, third Earl of Cumberland, was one of the country-house wives
whose misfortunes feature so prominently in verse of the period (the inscription on a Laurence Hilliard portrait of her reads ‘‘Constant in the Midst of
Inconstancy’’). Daniel’s epistle, far from advocating a meek submission to
the comings and goings of monarchs, tyrants, and other emblems of matrimonial power, praises the individual who ‘‘of such a height has built his mind’’
(line 1) that he looks down upon the ‘‘lower Regions of turmoyle’’ (line 13)
with a free eye and a ‘‘setled peace’’ (lines 9, 12); the epistle’s narrator assumes that a similar spiritual concord is available to the countess:
This Concord (Madame) of a wel-tun’d minde
Hath beene so set by that all-working hand
Of heaven, that though the world hath done his worst,
To put it out, by discords most unkinde,
Yet doth it still in perfect union stand

With God and Man, nor ever will be forc’t
From that most sweete accord, but still agree
Equall in Fortunes inequalitie.
(lines 116–23)25

Daniel attributes to the countess a very classical constancy, using a very
classical as well as very Elizabethan figure of speech. She is compared to an
instrument ‘‘wel-tun’d’’ by the virtuoso ‘‘hand / Of heaven.’’ Wordly discordance cannot mar the tuneful concord achieved between the musician and his
instrument. Daniel describes a woman who is worthy of both pity and, in
the last two lines, profound admiration: despite her tumultuous existence, her
equanimity of mind is so complete that she is equal not only to ‘‘Fortunes
inequalitie’’ but, as ‘‘Equall in’’ suggests, to ‘‘God and Man.’’
Daniel’s is a superb exhortation, but the epistolary poem is not an ideal
form for exploring the many sides of such complex counsel. Drama is a more
suitable medium, and the importation of Cleopatra from continental to English letters, via Mary Sidney Herbert’s translation of Robert Garnier’s Marcus Antoine, led to a dramatic reevaluation of the subtler ethical forces at
work on and within the character of Octavia, too, who had not been dealt with
before in English letters and who had been positioned in classical literature
as a foil to Cleopatra’s own voluptuousness. Octavia better exemplified the
qualities of the ideal Tudor Englishwoman—she valued her marriage, she was
devout, she was chauvinistic; she was, in short, an ideal character upon which
to work out the conflicts facing the Pembroke poets as they addressed issues
of patronage, succession, and religious and civil war and, possibly, as they
strove to take English letters in a Sidneian direction.26 As poets writing about
and inspired by a woman, answerable to her as patron, and answerable ultimately to the woman running the nation,27 Daniel, Greville, and Brandon
were forced to confront the scant opportunities for credible virtuous behavior
available to women who desired to be ethically autonomous (the ideal of
Stoic constancy) and spiritually obligated to no one but God (an assumption
of Calvinist theology). These poets found the most usable dramatic models
in the classical past because England saw itself mirrored in the Rome of the
early empire, because Queen Elizabeth faced—or so it was feared—the same
incompatible claims of personal love and national duty that Cleopatra faced,
and because England was not forced to confront in the present the civil and
religious strife tearing apart France and the Netherlands, although these issues did anticipate England’s own religious wars, and England was involved
and interested in resolving these foreign disputes to its best advantage.28 Of
these poets, however, only Samuel Brandon seems to have been alert to the
dramatic possibilities in and cultural echoes sounded by Octavia’s complex
ethical and political situation. And despite the ready similarities between
Cleopatra and Elizabeth as monarchs torn between public and private loyal-

ties, Octavia offered the politically safer and more virtuous likeness. Ironically, however, all the fictional Octavias use the language of classical
Stoicism to lament a specifically Tudor Christian lot.
The tone of Daniel’s verse letter from Octavia to Marc Antony (1599) differs significantly from the tone in his letter ‘‘To the Lady Margaret,’’ primarily because in the longer former epistle Octavia speaks, bitterly reproaching
Antony for his inconstancy and the inconstancy to which she herself is
doomed as a woman (stanzas 15 and 16). More interestingly, she also addresses the difficulty of her sex to escape the prison of custom and reputation
that is excoriated in Lipsius’s Two Bookes of Constancie:
I know not how, but wrongfully I know
Hath undiscerning custome plac’d our kind
Under desert, and set us farre below
The reputation to our sexe assign’d:
Charging our wrong reputed weaknesse, how
We are unconstant, fickle, false, unkinde:
And though our life with thousand proofes shewes no,
Yet since strength saies it, weaknesse must be so.29

According to Octavia, Roman men, from their position of political and domestic strength, create external reality. Far from following the evidence of
rational nature—as Stoics must—men ignore the ‘‘thousand proofes’’ of
women’s constancy. Ultimately, Octavia is indicting the very method by
which Stoics apprehend reality: those who believe in women’s inconstancy
are being misled by false impressions, while those who construct ‘‘undiscerning’’ impressions of women according to custom do so in the name of following nature, which is all Octavia herself is claiming to do:
We, in this prison of our selves confin’d,
Must here shut up with our owne passions live,
Turn’d in upon us, and denied to find
The vent of outward meanes that might relieve:
That they alone must take up all our mind,
And no room left us, but to thinke and grieve:
Yet oft our narrowed thoughts looke more direct
Than your loose wisdomes born with wild neglect.
(stanza 18)

Here Octavia admits that passion is inevitable, and in order for women to
achieve true constancy, this passion must be vented out so that external
‘‘meanes’’ can come in—a natural equilibrium between the outside and inside, a concordance with nature. She suggests that women have been impris-

oned by men, but that their solitary confinement, as it were, has resulted in
the wisdom that comes of long looking inward; her imagery, that is, suggests
there are alternatives to Stoic equilibrium as a way to wisdom.
Octavia perceives that Stoic constancy is inadequate to smooth over the
messy frailties of human nature. For her, constancy is primarily an action,
not a state of mind—this is a crucial distinction between her Stoicism and the
classical Stoic ideal. Thus, Octavia blames Antony’s infidelities on the general nature of humankind (and on Cleopatra), which makes doing ‘‘The lawfull undelightful’’ (stanza 41), more than on Antony’s peculiar weaknesses.
Daniel’s careful handling of tone suggests that Octavia is aware of her own
weaknesses and the lure of the consoling passions for herself: sanctimoniousness, vengeance, self-pity. In stanza 45, for example, Octavia’s vow to forgive Antony cannot quite efface, especially in lines 5 and 6, the extremity of
the shame she has suffered:
Yet all this [i.e., public opinion] shall not preiudice my Lord,
If yet he will but make returne at last;
His sight shall raze out of the sad record
Of my inrowled griefe all that is past:
And I will not so much as once afford
Place for a thought to thinke I was disgrac’d:
And pitty shall bring backe againe with me
Th’offended harts that have forsaken thee.

Unlike Daniel’s Octavia, Fulke Greville’s unnamed honorable lady does
not speak. In Greville’s Senecan epistle to her, she is urged to avoid the antistoical passions of fear and hope and to escape her corporal prison through a
reliance on divine grace and the cultivation of obedience. The epistle phrases
obedience less as wifely submission to her husband’s tyranny than as selfmastery through the avoidance of the ‘‘mists of opinion’’30 and the moderation of her desires (again, a Christian softening of the Stoic goal) to achieve
a ‘‘naturall Harmony’’ (273). Greville uses Octavia as the exemplar of this
self-mastery. According to Greville, Octavia might have done many things to
attempt to win Antony back because compared with Cleopatra ‘‘she was as
yong, equall in beauty, stronger in honour’’; unfortunately, Octavia was also
‘‘ever the same, which (she knew) was not so pleasing to [Antony], as the
same in others’’: ‘‘[T]o be short, [she] was content, when she could not doe
the workes of a well-beloved Wife, yet to doe well, as becomes all excellent
Women. In which course of moderation, shee neither made the World her
Judge, nor the Market her Theater, but contented her sweet minde with the
triumphs of Patience’’ (285–86, first set of italics mine).
Greville’s sympathy for the Octavia character is pervasive and subtle. He
knows she is the victim of Antony’s arbitrary preference for Cleopatra and

so offers her his recognition of Antony’s inconstancy rather than the mere
solace of constancy, ‘‘the triumphs of Patience.’’ But Greville’s advice to the
honorable lady, while extensive and compassionate, is predicated on the
lady’s inability to effect change or to sustain herself without divine intervention; it is also predicated on the more troubling issue of her sex. Greville
takes great pains to demonstrate that women are naturally more constant than
men, but he mourns Eve’s lapse in the Garden, which means that woman’s
constant love for men must now, sadly, be reciprocated with the ‘‘unconstant
proportions of Power, and Will’’ (260). In other words, Greville’s emphasis
on self-mastery seems to gesture toward a fully Stoic constancy for the honorable lady, even as it registers the reality of women’s inferior social position
(273–74), but his final interpretation of Octavia—and of the state natural to
women—is one of Christian obedience. This suggests that for Greville both
Stoicism and Christianity, universal reason and divine law, share a foundation in male superiority: ‘‘Yet Noble Lady! Because you are a Woman, and a
Wife; and by the Lawes of both these estates, [you are] in some measure
ordain’d to live under meane, and supreame authority’’ (273). In Greville’s
letter, a far more lengthy and rhetorically complex analysis of the relationship of gender to ethics than Daniel’s, the unnatural, monstrous, tyrannical
abuses of power displayed by the lady’s husband are not general perversions
of the man’s humanity, but specifically of his natural superiority as a man,
a superiority underscored by Greville’s frequent references to humankind’s
original fall from grace and illustrated through the frequent analogy of man
to monarch.
Scholars who characterize the advice given or illustrated by the epistles of
Daniel and Greville as Stoic (or Neostoic) are missing the complexities the
Octavia character brings to the attempted reconciliation of Christianity and
Stoicism. Greville urges the honorable lady to consider all the things Octavia
might have done, given her position, to save her ‘‘from the barren grounds of
Duty’’ (285) but did not—avenge herself on Antony or pursue political power
by allying herself with her brother, for example. Daniel’s Octavia acknowledges the difficulty of matching her violent passions to her submissive actions. Both epistles, however, rely on a type of ‘‘great chain of being’’
argument to examine Octavia’s position which does not quite correspond to
Seneca’s Stoic maxim that the wise man is ethically superior to God and
which is unsympathetic to an Epictetian elevation of the lower classes via the
development of self-mastery. Daniel’s Octavia, for example, observes that
Antony’s class superiority demands concomitant moral superiority: ‘‘What
doth divide the Cottage from the Throne, / If vice shall lay both levell with
disgrace?’’ (stanza 14).
Once Samuel Brandon places Octavia at the center of a drama, the tensions
and inconsistencies between Christianity and Stoicism—especially as they
manifest themselves for women—are given free play. Brandon’s Octavia

shares her dilemma with Daniel’s, with Greville’s honorable lady, and with
the many country-house mistresses to whom these works and others are addressed or dedicated. But Brandon utilizes genre most effectively to illustrate
Octavia’s moral plight. Without exception, the classical sources for the Octavia story do not exploit the drama of her position in relation to Antony and
Cleopatra, and without exception they do not allow Octavia to speak for herself or to initiate action, even when, as Plutarch, Appian, and Dio Cassius do,
historians emphasize Octavia’s role in averting war between her husband and
brother. Brandon, like Greville, ultimately supports a Christian restraint of
the passions for Octavia, and advocates her refusal to avenge herself on Antony in the face of reasonable and politically sound advice to the contrary,
but we see that none of these virtuous behaviors leads to her peace of mind,
which Stoicism is expressly designed to do. Thus by foregrounding Octavia’s
plight and allowing her to speak for herself, as Daniel’s Octavia also does,
and by situating her within a context of civil war, as the classical sources do,
Brandon ably exploits the implications of, as Lipsius puts it, the civil war of
the mind, by pitching Octavia not only between her husband and brother but
between Christian virtue and Stoic constancy.
Brandon’s drama, to which is appended an exchange of verse letters between Octavia and Antony written in the tone of Daniel’s ‘‘Letter from Octavia,’’ covers the period between the battle of Tarentum and the deaths of
Cleopatra and Antony.31 It is in some ways an uninspired drama of its
type—in its conventional rhetorical flourishes and pentameter filling and its
rather plodding march through the events leading to the deaths of the lovers.
Senecan closet drama stands or falls on its handling of ideas, however, and it
is in this realm that Brandon’s drama has been unjustly neglected. There are
considerable unexpected touches that deepen interest in Octavia’s plight and
lay bare the inadequacies of Christian Stoic platitudes, some of them Brandon’s invention, some of them odd inclusions from his sources.
I have already mentioned the suitability of the Octavia character for illustrating an ideal English womanhood, an ideal that represents contemporary
Christianity and translates a classical model of constancy into New Roman
terms. Typically Cleopatra has borne the responsibility of serving as this
ideal and its negative, as a warning to fair women (including Queen Elizabeth) and as an example of a woman who has been redeemed by love.32
Scholarly attention has thus naturally focused itself on the Cleopatra figure
because of her political importance to early modern England and because of
her inherent fascination. No such fascination attaches to Octavia, although
Shakespeare, in his treatment of her in Antony and Cleopatra, will draw attention to her marginal status in a quietly enigmatic way that emphasizes her
contrast to Cleopatra.
Brandon’s drama opens with a monologue by Octavia that begins as a
Chaucerian celebration of earth’s springtime youth, then segues ironically

into an observation of the illusory nature of human authority: ‘‘we, whom
reason named . . . Princes of all the rest that nature framed: / Still subject
are to sorrowes tyranny; / Slaves to mischance, vassals of fortunes power.’’33
Octavia’s initial description of the natural world, before her bitter introduction of human misery, is of a ‘‘golden time’’ (1), which suggests a paradise
neither exclusively pagan nor Christian. More importantly, Octavia’s reference—and the diction of her lament—suggests a political golden time that is
undercut by the brazen personal drama of which she is a part. Like the Lipsius character in Two Bookes of Constancie, Octavia seeks to flee a civil war
within her mind, but unlike that character, Octavia is the catalyst for peace
in the actual civil war between her husband and brother; in other words, Octavia (like Cleopatra) bears a responsibility for family and country that the
Lipsius character does not. Brandon highlights Octavia’s dilemma with inventive literalness in act 1, when Titius arrives to report that Octavia has
halted fighting at Tarentum by appearing on the battlefield ‘‘Minerva-like’’
(255) between the two armies: ‘‘No womans weapon blindes her princely
eye; / No womans weakenesse, hir tongues passage stayes: / Like one, that
did both death, and fate defie’’ (252–54). Because we see Octavia in her private character and in her public character (via the reporting of action, the
typical means of communicating events in Senecan drama), we can appreciate the very deep divide between Octavia’s outward constancy and her inward
turmoil—a divide the works of Greville and Daniel, with their limited perspectives, cannot fully articulate.
Brandon provides the drama’s richest irony, however, by linking Octavia
with the inspired character Sylvia, ‘‘a licentious woman.’’ Sylvia appears in
the second half of act 2 (shortly before Octavia’s oscillating response to her
brother’s desire for vengeance on Antony) in conversation with the ‘‘Romaine ladies’’ Iulia and Camilla. As the two latter discuss Antony’s behavior,
Sylvia attacks the very notion of virtue with an attack on constancy: ‘‘Were I
Octavia I would entertaine / His double dealing, with as fine a sleight . . .
One nayle you see another will expel, / When nothing else can force the same
to moove’’ (755–56). To Camilla’s remonstrance that she ought to fear the
wrath of heaven, Sylvia replies:
The wrath of heaven, why no, the heavens are iust,
And Iustice yeeldes a man his due desert:
Then sithe I do no iniurie, I trust
Not I, but he, for both our faults shall smart.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
But tis most strange to see you go about,
To praise the thing that workes all womens fall.
Why constancie is that which marreth all
A weake conceipt which cannot wrongs resist,

A chaine it is which bindes our selues in thrall,
And gives men scope to use us as they list.
For when they know that you will constant bide,
Small is their care, how often they do slide.
(783–91)

Her rhetoric is, ironically, similar to Octavia’s at the end of act 4, when Octavia admits that Antony will not change and thus trusts her soul to virtue’s
superior justice. Clearly, the Stoic maxim that virtue is its own reward does
not prompt Sylvia’s moral perspective; Sylvia, in fact, crafts a positive ethical
system out of the very difficulties that confront Daniel’s and Brandon’s Octavias—achieving constancy among men who undermine its definition by divorcing it from virtue, as Brandon’s Antony does, with taunting disdain, in
his letter to Octavia:
Heere will I shew, I neither am
Unconstant, nor unkinde:
For Cleopatra whiles I live,
Shall me most constant finde.
Why am I call’d an Emperour,
If I should subject be:
And be compeld to leave the thing,
Which most delighteth me?
(721–28)

What makes Sylvia so inspired a character is not her stock licentiousness
but the way she casts into doubt the assured morality expressed by the play’s
principals. Sylvia is the most Stoic of them all, refusing to be subject to her
passions. In this she resembles Anthony (at least as Anthony imagines himself to be), and in her response to Iulia’s remonstrance, Brandon uses Sylvia’s
similarity to Antony to point up the shaky construction of the gender-classvirtue equation:
Affection, no, I know not such a thought,
That were a way to make my selfe a slave:
I hate subiection and will nere be brought,
What now I give, at others hands to crave.
(865–68)

As Marta Straznicky has pointed out, not only does Sylvia claim the sexual
freedom of a man, but she also dares to compare her lot with that of a man
of aristocratic birth.34 Her lengthy musings eventually prompt the spellbound
Roman ladies to deride her as unnatural, but Brandon’s treatment shifts ‘‘unnatural’’ from Sylvia’s licentiousness to the moral and passional emptiness
she and Antony share. Over the course of the play, Sylvia becomes increas-

ingly important to an understanding of Brandon’s interpretation of constancy.
Sylvia believes inconstancy to be humankind’s usual state of existence and,
in fact, a natural law. Octavia herself briefly disdains constant behavior and
vows revenge upon Antony. As she says resignedly to her brother Octavius:
I know not what you thinke of woman kinde,
That they are faithlesse and unconstant ever:
For me, I thinke all women strive to finde
The perfect good, and therein to persever.
(1298–1301)

Striving to find this good, Octavia has at times echoed Sylvia in her belief
that inconstant behavior is ordained by nature (line 1699, e.g.), and by the
end of act 4 even one of the Roman ladies will echo Sylvia’s explanation
for Antony’s continued rejection of Octavia. It is not Antony’s fault, decides
Iulia,
for nature is the cause.
By nature are we moov’d, nay forst to love:
And being forst, can we resist the same?
The powerful hand of heaven we wretches proove:
Who strike the stroke, and poore we, beare the blame.
(1960–64)

Not until Shakespeare will the emotional complexity attending this historical
period be better shown, nor will there be such a fully realized Octavia. Unlike
Shakespeare’s art, however, Brandon’s is unequal to his thought, but as Mary
Ellen Lamb puts it, the play presents, ‘‘as perhaps a better play would not
dare, the pathology from which the heroics of constancy drew its strength.’’35
Recall that the passions (or affections, as Lipsius calls them) so dangerous
to Christian reason spring, according to Stoic philosophy, from incorrect
judgments, that is, opinions rather than the things themselves. The true Stoic
ideal does not recognize inner turmoil as natural: ‘‘Because passion is error
it must be suppressed, and this can be done by rectifying the erroneous judgement, the opinion, which gives birth to it.’’36 This certainly describes Sylvia,
whose judgments, we learn, are completely dispassionate: ‘‘But I take order
not to perish so,’’ she says, in ‘‘endlesse misery’’; ‘‘He shall care little, that
cares lesse then I’’ (776–78). Octavia’s passions, on the other hand—her patriotism, her devotion to her brother, her love for Antony, her desire to fulfill
her social and political obligations—are inextricably linked to her virtue,
which escapes a pure association with either Christianity or Stoicism. In fact,
every character in Brandon’s drama demonstrates more constancy than Octavia, so that it becomes impossible, by the play’s end, to link constancy with
virtue. Octavia’s two last lines of the play pay lip service to a Christianized

patience that will enable her to bear what the heavens have assigned to her on
the unhappy world’s stage, but the remainder of her closing speech, spoken in
response to news of Antony and Cleopatra’s deaths, belies this patience with
a Job-like lamentation: ‘‘But from the very instant of my birth, / Uncessant
woes my tyred heart have wasted . . . Successive cares with utter ruine threate
me; / Griefe is enchain’d with griefe, and woe with woe’’ (2266–67, 2275–
76). The deaths of Antony and Cleopatra seem to lead her close to emotional
despair, and her final lamentation is answered only by the Chorus, which can
at most promise that her reputation for virtue—that ‘‘smoake of opinion’’—
will live on immortally: this is Brandon’s ironic reminder that the gulf between human passion and the ideals of divine reason remains unbridgeable.
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